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ATTACKS ON AMERICA-PRIVACY IMPLICATIONS
OF HEIGHTENED SECURITY MEASURES
IN THE UNITED STATES, EUROPE, AND CANADA
RUWANTISSA ABEYRATNE*
I. INTRODUCTION
AS A CONSEQUENCE of the attacks on the United States,
which took place on September 11, 2001, aviation paid the
irrecoverable cost of having aircraft used as weapons of mass de-
struction. An inevitable corollary to these incidents would be
heightened security at airports and airline check-in counters.
Some of these security measures would undeniably include the
use of advance passenger information and biometric identifica-
tion methods. The latter is part of Simplified Passenger Travel
(SPT), which is a process introduced largely to alleviate the
usual drawn-out process of passenger clearance at airports that
had become characteristic of air travel. The system anchors it-
self on the use of a smart card holding relevant information of
the passenger that can be swiped through a machine, giving in-
stant clearance. I
Hand in hand with the use of a smart card is the practice of
exchanging Advance Passenger Information (API), whereby a
passenger' s information is provided, in advance of his arrival, to
the immigration and customs authorities of the destination
State, particularly to be used for deciding whether that passen-
ger shall be admitted to the State or not. The customs authori-
ties conceived the idea of an API system. They identified the
need to address the increased risk posed by airline passengers in
recent years, especially regarding drug trafficking and other
threats to national security. In some locations, this need to en-
* The author is a senior official at the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO). He has written this article in his personal capacity.
I For more information on the use of the smart card, see Ruwantissa I.R.
Abeyratne, The Automated Screening of Passengers and the Smart Card-Emerging Legal
Issues, 23 AIR & SPACE LAW 3, 3-7 (1998).
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hance controls, combined with the growth of air passenger traf-
fic, began to place a severe strain on the resources of customs
and immigration services, resulting in unacceptable delays in
the processing of arriving passengers at airports. As a means of
addressing the twin objectives of improved compliance and
faster clearance of low-risk passengers, customs and immigration
officials envisioned a system in which passengers' identification
data could be sent to the authorities and processed against com-
puter databases while the aircraft was in flight.
Article 29 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation
(the Chicago Convention) requires every aircraft engaged in in-
ternational navigation to carry certain documents, including "a
list of [passenger] names and places of embarkation and desti-
nation."2  Annex 9 to the Convention, on facilitation of air
transport, specifies that presentation of the passenger manifest
document shall not normally be required, but, if information is
required, it is to be limited to the data elements included in the
prescribed format, i.e., names, places of embarkation and desti-
nation, and flight details.'
When this standard was adopted, it contemplated the passen-
ger manifest as a paper document, either typed or written, and
delivered by hand. The concept of limiting the amount of in-
formation to be collected and delivered to that which is essential
to meet the basic objectives of safety, efficiency, and regulatory
compliance applies equally to modern electronic-data in-
terchange systems, such as API, where additional, but not unlim-
ited, data can be transmitted to the authorities in exchange for a
more efficient clearance operation. It is widely recognized that
in any system involving the exchange of information, automated
or not, it is the collection of data that creates the major expense.
Increases in data-collection requirements should result in bene-
fits that exceed the additional costs.
As the airlines and control authorities progress in their refine-
ment of the system and improvement of its performance, pas-
senger clearance times for transoceanic flights (which, prior to
use of API, frequently involved delays in excess of two hours)
have been reduced to averages well below the recommended
goal of forty-five minutes stipulated in Annex 9. In addition to
2 Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, art. 29, 61 Stat.
1180, 15 U.N.T.S. 295 [hereinafter Chicago Convention]. A copy of the Conven-
tion may be obtained from the ICAO, Doc. 7300/8 (8th ed. 2000).
3 Chicago Convention, supra note 2, at Annex 9, std. 2.7 (emphasis added).
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this improvement in efficiency, the control authorities have real-
ized an enhancement of their enforcement efforts, due to the
fact that the receipt of information in advance gives them more
time to process passenger information and make better deci-
sions regarding their inspection targets and the appropriate
level of control.
The data transmitted by the airlines to immigration and cus-
toms authorities of recipient States include details contained in
the machine-readable zone of a passport,4 plus specific data con-
cerning the inbound flight, such as airports of departure/arri-
val, flight number, and date. An Electronic Data Interchange
for Administration, Commerce and Transport (EDIFACT) mes-
sage format is used to transmit the data by EDI. The system
works well, but is very demanding in terms of requirements for
high levels of thoroughness and accuracy of data provided. Un-
like cargo shipments, each of which is processed for clearance
on its own track, passengers must pass through immigration and
customs as a "flight" and are interdependent with respect to the
time it takes to clear them. If data on too many passengers is
missing, the whole group is delayed, and so are the flights of
passengers arriving after them.
There is an ongoing tug-of-war between the airlines and immi-
gration/customs services over airline-system performance stan-
dards versus short clearance times (facilitation benefits)
provided by the authorities. But the reality is that the higher the
data quality, the faster the clearance can be accomplished. So,
the airlines must meet a certain standard of data quality in order
to get "blue lane" treatment.
One issue that emerges as important in the API process is that
the data required must be collectable by machine or already
contained in the airline's system. Manual collection and data
entry at the check-in desk for a scheduled flight is time-consum-
ing and prone to errors and, therefore, is not acceptable. Fortu-
nately, most travellers now hold machine-readable passports
(MRPs) and, as a result, manual input need only be done on an
exception basis. Participation in API must be done in conjunc-
tion with a measurable improvement in facilitation. The author-
ities concerned must also ensure an improvement in security.
4 For details on the machine-readable passport and its development in the
ICAO, see Ruwantissa I. R. Abeyratne, The Development of the Machine Readable Pass-
port and Visa and the Legal Rights of the Data Subject, 27 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 1,
1-31 (1992).
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Another important issue that could be raised within the um-
brella of API pertains to the privacy of the data subject. This
article examines the status of the privacy of individuals in North
America and Europe and how it will be impacted by the security
measures that may be taken in the field of aviation in the wake
of the September 11 attacks on the United States.
The data subject, like any other person, has an inherent right
to his privacy. The subject of privacy has been identified as an
intriguing and emotional one.' The right to privacy is inherent
in the concept of liberty, and is the most comprehensive of
rights and the right most valued by civilized man.6 However,
this right is susceptible to erosion, as modern technology is ca-
pable of easily recording and storing dossiers on every man, wo-
man and child in the world.' The data subject's right to privacy
is brought into focus by Alan Westin, who defined privacy as
"the claim of individuals, groups or institutions to determine for
themselves when, how, and to what extent information is com-
municated to others."8 There are four rights of privacy relating
to the storage and use of personal data:
1. The right of an individual to determine what personal infor-
mation to share with others, and to control the disclosure of
such data;
2. The right of an individual to know what personal data are
disclosed, what data are collected, and where such data are
stored;
3. The right to dispute incomplete or inaccurate personal data;
and
4. The right of those who have a legitimate right to know per-
sonal data in order to maintain the health and safety of soci-
ety and to monitor and evaluate the activities of
government.'
5 John B. Young, A Look at Privacy, in PRIVACY 1 (John B. Young ed., 1978).
Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right To Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193 (1890).
7 As far back as 1973 it was claimed that "ten reels each containing 1,500 me-
tres of tape 2.5 [centimetres] wide could store a twenty-page dossier on every
man, woman, and child in the world." R.V. Jones, Some Threats of Technology to
Privacy, in PRIVACY & HUMAN RIGHTS 139, 158 (A. H. Robertson ed., 1973)
(presented at the Third International Colloquy about the European Convention
on Human Rights, Brussels, Sept. 30-Oct. 3, 1970).
8 ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7, 124 (1967).
9 Gordon C. Everest, Nonuniform Privacy Laws: Implications and Attempts at Uni-
formity, in COMPUTERS AND PRIVACY IN THE NEXT DECADE 141, 142 (Lance J. Hoff-
man ed., 1980).
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It is incontrovertible therefore that the data subject has a
right to decide what information about himself to share with
others and more importantly, to know what data are collected
about him. This right is balanced against the right of a society
to collect data about individuals so that the orderly running of
government is ensured.
II. ISSUES OF PRIVACY
The role played by technology in modern-day commercial
transactions has affected a large number of activities pertaining
to human interaction. The emergence of the information su-
perhighway and the concomitant evolution of automation have
inevitably transformed the social and personal lifestyles and
value systems of individuals, created unexpected business oppor-
tunities, reduced operating costs, accelerated transaction times,
facilitated accessibility to communications, shortened distances,
and removed bureaucratic formalities."' Progress notwithstand-
ing; technology has bestowed on humanity automated mecha-
nisms, devices, features, and procedures that intrude into
personal lives of individuals. For instance, when a credit card is
used, it is possible to track purchases, discovering numerous as-
pects about that particular individual, including food prefer-
ences, leisure activities, and consumer credit behavior." In a
similar vein, computer records of an air carrier's reservation sys-
tem may give out details of a passenger's travel preferences, inter
alia, seat selection, destination fondness, ticket-purchasing dos-
sier, lodging keenness, temporary address and telephone con-
tacts, attendance at theatres and sport activities, and whether
the passenger travels alone or with someone else.' 2 This scheme
10 See generally GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR (Clarendon Press
1984) (1949).
'I For a detailed analysis of the implications of credit cards with respect to the
right of privacy, see STEVEN L. NOCK, THE COSTS OF PRIVACY: SURVEILLANCE AND
REPUTATION IN AMERICA 43 (1993).
12 The paramount importance of airline computer reservation system records
is reflected in the world-renowned cases of Libyan ArabJamahiriya v. United King-
dom and Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States regarding the 1988 PanAm 103
accident at Lockerbie, Scotland, where the International Court of Justice re-
quested air carriers to submit to the Court the defendants' flight information and
reservation details. See International Court ofJustice News Release 99/36, Ques-
tions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising
from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (July 1, 1999), available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/ipresscom/ipressl999/ipresscom9936_iluklus_19990701.htm.
Similarly, Arthur R. Miller describes the significance of airline computer reserva-
tion system records when dealing with federal, state, local, and other types of
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of things may well give the outward perception of surveillance
attributable to computer devices monitoring individuals' most
intimate activities and preferences, leading to the formation of a
genuine "traceable society."'13
The main feature of this complex web of technological activity
is that the enormous amount of personal information being
handled by such varied players from the public and private sec-
tor may bring about concerns of possible "data leaks" in the sys-
tem, a risk that could have drastic legal consequences affecting
an individual's rights to privacy.
At the international level, privacy was first recognized as a fun-
damental freedom in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights.' 4 Thereafter, several other human rights conventions
followed the same trend, granting individuals the fundamental
right of privacy.' 5 The preeminent concern of these interna-
tional instruments was to establish the necessary legal frame-
work to protect the individual and his inherent right to the
enjoyment of a private life.
investigations where these dossiers could provide valuable information. ARTHUR
R. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIvACY 42 (1971).
13 See GINi GRAiiAM ScoTIT, MIND YOUR OWN BUSINESS: THE BAT-rLE FOR PER-
SONAL PRIvAcY 307 (1995); DAVID BURNHAM, TIE RISE OF THE COMPUTER STATE 20
(1983). A contrario to the argument supported in this thesis (that the advance-
ment of technology directly affects the intimacy of individuals), United States
CircuitJudge Richard Posner favors the idea that other factors, such as urbaniza-
tion, income, and mobility development have particularly weakened the informa-
tion control that the government has over individuals: this denotes that
individuals' privacy has increased. See Richard Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA.
L. REV. 393, 409 (1978).
14 The text reads: "No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his
privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and
reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such inter-
ference or attacks." See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III),
U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., at art. 12, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
15 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI),
art. 17, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966);
American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man, O.A.S. Res. XXX, art. 5, Inter-
national Conference of American States, 9th Conf., OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/I. 4 Rev.
XX (1948); American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, art. 11, 1144
U.N.T.S. 123; International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of Migrant Work-
ers and Members of Their Families, G.A. Res. 158, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., Agenda
Item 12, art. 14, U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/158 (1991), refirinted in 30 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 1519 (1991); Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 25, U.N.
GAOR, 44th Sess., Agenda Item 108, art. 16, U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/25 (1989),
reprinted in 28 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1456.
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Privacy represents different things for different people.1" The
concept per se has evolved throughout the history of mankind:
first, as the original anti-intrusion approach, which defended an
individual's property and physical body against unwanted inva-
sions and intrusions; then manifesting in whom to associate
with; later enlarging its scope to include privacy as the individ-
ual's decision-making right;' 7 and culminating in the control
over one's personal information.' 8 The conceptual evolution of
privacy is directly related to the technological advancement of
each particular period in history.
The right of privacy, as enunciated by United States Judge
Thomas M. Cooley, was the right "to be let alone" and was a part
of a more general right to one's personality.19 This idea was
given further impetus by two prominent young lawyers, Samuel
D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, in 1890.20 Before this idea
was introduced, privacy reflected primarily a somewhat limited,
"physical" property or concept. By contrast, "information pri-
vacy," where individuals determine when, how, and to what ex-
tent information about themselves shall be communicated to
others, in other words, the right to control information about
16 See PRISCILLA M. REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY 33 (1995); Paul A. Freund, Pri-
vacy: One Concept or Many, in PRIVACY 182 (U. Roland Pennock & John W. Chap-
man eds., 1971).
17 In this case, the U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged the right of women to
have abortions based on the grounds that the federal government could not in-
terfere within her decisional privacy sphere. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153
(1973). See also FRED H. CATE, PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 49 (1997). See
also WILLIAM ZELERMYER, INVASION OF PRIVACY 16 (1959).
18 In a remarkable case concerning the legality of a national census scheduled
by the authorities, the German Constitutional court connected the individuals'
liberty and the personal data processing of the intended census, to rule that if the
individuals do not know for what purposes and who is collecting the data, that
situation will eventually create an abdication of the individual's rights to the
processor's command, which cannot be tolerated in a democratic society. See Spiros
Simitis, From the Market to the Polis: The EU Directive on the Protection of Personal Data,
80 IowA L. REV. 445, 447-48 (1995); see also STEVEN HOFFER, WORLD CYBERSPACE
LAw 8-2 (2000); Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of the Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421,
423 (1980).
19 See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 6, at 195 (citing THOMAS M. COOLEY, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS 29 (2d ed. 1888)).
20 The definition of privacy as the "right to be let alone" is often erroneously
attributed to Warren and Brandeis. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 6, at 195.
Additionally, the concept of privacy as "the right to be let alone," as well as "the
right most valued by civilized man," was embraced by U.S. courts in the landmark
dissenting opinion ofJustice Louis D. Brandeis in Olmsted v. United States, 277 U.S.
438, 478 (1928).
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oneself,2' is a cornerstone of modern ideas of privacy. With the
development of computer capabilities to handle large amounts
of data, privacy has been enlarged to include the collection,
storage, use, and disclosure of personal information. 22 The no-
tion of informational privacy protection, a typically American us-
age, has been particularly popular both in the United States and
Europe, where the term "data protection" is used. 3
The German Bundesverfassungsgericht judicially embraced
self-determination in the right to protect one's privacy in 1983.4
The Supreme Court of the United States followed this trend by
adopting the principle of privacy self-determination in Depart-
ment of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press.2 5
It must be borne in mind that privacy is not an absolute, un-
limited right that operates in isolation.26 It is not an absolute
right applied unreservedly to the exclusion of other rights.
Hence, there is frequently the necessity to balance privacy rights
against other conflicting rights, such as the freedom of speech
and the right to access information, when examining individu-
als' rights vis-d-vis the interests of society.2 7 This multiplicity of
interests will prompt courts to adopt a balanced approach when
21 See WESTIN, supra note 8, at 368. For a similar conceptualization of privacy,
see Charles Fried, Privacy: Economics and Ethics, A Comment on Posner 12 GA. L. REV.
423, 425 (1978).
22 SeeJoel R. Reidenberg, Setting Standards for Fair Information Practice in the U.S.
Private Sector, 80 IowA L. REV. 497, 498 (1995).
23 The term "data protection" has been translated from the German word
datenschutz, referring to a set of policies seeking to regulate the collection, stor-
age, use, and transfer of personal information. See COLINJ. BENNET, REGULATING
PRIVACY 13 (1992).
24 In a remarkable case concerning the legality of a national census scheduled
by the authorities, the German constitutional court connected the individual's
liberty and the personal data processing of the intended census, to rule that if the
individuals do not know for what purposes and who is collecting the data, that
situation will eventually create an abdication of the individual's rights to the
processor's command, which cannot be tolerated in a democratic society. See
Simitis, supra note 18, at 447-48.
25 489 U.S. 749, 763 (1989).
2 See Arnold Simmel, Privacy Is Not an Isolated Freedom, in PRIVACY 71 (1. Roland
Pennnock &John W. Chapman eds., 1971).
27 See ANDREW HALPIN, RIGHTS & LAw: ANALYSIS & THEORY 111 (1997); see also
Leslie G. Foschio, Motor Vehicle Records: Balancing Individual Privacy and the Public's
Legitimate Need to Know, in PRIVACY AND PUBLIcrrY 35 (Theodore R. Kupferman
ed., 1990). For a comprehensive study on the conflictive interest between privacy
and the mass media and the Freedom of Speech, see DON R. PEMBER, PRIVACY
AND THE PRESS 227-249 (1972); Judith B. Prowda, A Lawyer's Ramble Down the
Information Superhighway: Privacy and Security of Data, 64 FORDIlAM L. REV. 738, 769
(1995). See also AMERICAN PRESS INSTITUTE J. MONTGOMERY CURTIS MEMORIAL
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adjudicating a person's rights, particularly where the interests of
a State are involved.
A. PRIVACY ISSUES IN THE UNITED STATES
It would not be incorrect to recognize the fact that the right
of privacy originally evolved in the United States following the
appearance of an influential article written by Warren and Bran-
deis.28 This article was prompted by the increasing intrusion of
the newspaper media, particularly the yellow press, which pub-
licly scrutinized personal issues of Bostonian society in the late
1800s. 29 Although Warren and Brandeis stress the importance
of protecting the individual right of privacy against mass-media
invasion by suggesting that an independent cause of action
under tort law is necessary, the issue remains primarily applica-
ble to private individuals. °
The right of privacy brings to bear the need to identify possi-
ble scenarios when addressing issues of privacy rights. The
United States has a two-pronged approach to the right of
privacy:
1) Privacy rights between the individual and the State; and
2) Privacy rights between different individuals.
The former consideration involves both U.S. constitutional
law, since indirect references to privacy are found in the Bill of
Rights, and federal legislation, including some specific legisla-
tion Congress has enacted." The latter is addressed through
the law of torts, and is, hence, a governmental matter involving
specific legislation regulating certain industries. 2 It should be
noted that the United States has adopted the approach of
sectoral regulation in terms of privacy, as opposed to the enact-
SEMINAR, THE PUBLIC, PRIVACY AND THE PRESS: HAVE THE MEDIA GONE Too FAR?, 2
(1992).
28 See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 6, at 195.
29 Apparently the concern of Samuel Warren for privacy was born when the
emerging Bostonian yellow press scandalized his wife's entertainment activities.
See MILLER, supra note 12, at 170. For a good study on colonial privacy in New
England, see DAVID H. FLAHERTY, PRIVACY IN COLONIAL NEW ENGLAND 164 (1972).
30 The former Privacy Commissioner of British Columbia, Canada asserted
that privacy was originally a nonlegal concept. See David H. Flaherty, On the Utility of
Constitutional Rights to Privacy and Data Protection, 41 CASE W. RES. 831, 832 (1991).
31 The Supreme Court of the United States has strongly affirmed that the U.S.
Constitution does not grant privacy rights to private individuals among them-
selves, thus leading to its resolution to the law of torts. See Prudential Ins. Co. v.
Cheek, 259 U.S. 530, 543 (1922).
32 See CATE, supra note 17; see also ZELERMYER, supra note 17.
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ment of the "omnibus data protection statues" undertaken in
Europe." This makes U.S. conceptualization of the right of the
privacy admit as little government interference as possible.
Three factual bases encompass the rationale for the approach in
the United States. First, a large number of Americans believe
that their rights can be adequately protected through the imple-
mentation of industry codes, norms and business practices, com-
pany policies, proper technical network structure, good
corporate citizenship through the implementation of guide-
lines, 4 and perhaps even through contractual arrangements,
particularly on the basis that the market has matured sufficiently
enough to be self-regulated. 3' This attitude reflects the trust of
the American people in the private sector. A contrario, numer-
ous commentators and prominent civil liberties groups have ex-
pressed profound concerns about whether further government
intervention has become necessary.36 Second, the tremendous
power of influential industry lobbying groups strongly opposes
any further government intervention with business. United
States lobbying groups have direct access to the White House,
and thus represent considerably more bargaining power than
the individual data subject.37 Third, the United States favors the
free flow of information according to the principles embraced
by the First Amendment,38 based on the premise that the availa-
bility of information will be regulated by the marketplace of
'13 See IAN J. LLOYD, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY LAW 38 (2d ed. 1997).
34 For an interesting business guidelines compromise with respect to the pri-
vacy of customers, see Direct Marketing Association, Privacy Promise Member Com-
pliance Guide: Keeping Our Privacy Promise to Consumers, at http://www.the-
dma.org/library/privacy/privacypromise.shtml (last visited July 13, 2000).
35 See Reidenberg, supra note 22, at 515.
36 SeeJoel. R. Reidenberg, Restoring Americans' Privacy in Electronic Commerce, 14
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 771, 792 (1999); Robert M. Gellman, Fragmented, Incomplete,
and Discontinuous: The Failure of Federal Privacy Regulatory Proposals and Institutions,
6 SOFTWARE L.J. 199 (1993); Mark E. Budnitz, Privacy Protection for Consumer Trans-
actions in Electronic Commerce: Why Self-Regulation is Inadequate, 49 S.C. L. REV. 847,
860 (1998) (indicating that the U.S. Government, while acknowledging the seri-
ous threats to the privacy of consumers, has decided to adopt an industry self
regulation approach which conflicts with the EC Directive); Patricia Mell, A Hitch-
hiker's Guide to Trans-Border Data Exchanges Between EU Member States and the United
States Under the European Union Directive on the Protection of Personal Information, 9
PACE INT'L L. REV. 147, 182 (1991); Jennifer M. Myers, Creating Data Protection
Legislation in the United States: An Examination of Current Legislation in the European
Union, Spain, and the United States, 29 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 109, 146 (1997).
17 See generally JAMES RULE ET AL., THE POLITICS OF PRIVACY (1980).
38 U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
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ideas, hence reflecting an enormous trust thereto. 9 In addi-
tion, some commentators suggest that excessive protection of
personal information would inevitably distort efficient market
functions.4 0 Therefore, it is unlikely that the U.S. Congress will
enact a general, comprehensive set of rules addressing privacy,
as prevails in Europe.4
Commentators in the United States have identified five
dimensions, or categories, of privacy: 1) "Physical Privacy," ad-
dressed through issues related to the physical integrity of the
individual, originally protected through the tort of trespass to
the person;4" 2) "Decisional Privacy," embraced in the landmark
case Roe v. Wade,43 where the U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged
the right of privacy to include the right to make one's own deci-
sions about activities related to marriage, procreation, contra-
ception, abortion, family relationships, and education; 3)
"Communications Privacy," related to the First Amendment's
Freedom of Speech and Association, where an individual is
granted the right freely to communicate among peers; 4) "Ter-
39 In this respect, Fred H. Cate has written:
The U.S. approach to information privacy inevitably results in some
harm to individual's privacy, reputations, and sensibilities. But it
reflects a constitutional calculation that such harm is less threaten-
ing to the body politic than the harm associated with centralized
privacy protection, government interference with the information
flows necessary to sustain democracies and markets, and the grow-
ing ineffectiveness of omnibus legal controls in the face of the wide-
spread proliferation of powerful information technologies.
Fred H. Cate, The Changing Face of Privacy Protection in the European Union and the
United States, 33 IND. L. REV. 174, 231 (1999).
40 See Posner, supra note 13, at 400; see also GRAHAM Scovr, supra note 13, at
307; BURNHAM, supra note 13, at 20. A contrario to the argument supported in this
thesis that the advancement of technology directly affects the intimacy of individ-
uals, U.S. CircuitJudge Richard Posner favors the idea that other factors, such as
urbanization, income, and mobility development have particularly weakened the
information control that, for instance, the government has over individuals; this
denotes that individuals' privacy has increased. See Posner, supra note 13, at 409.
41 See Pamela Samuelson, A New Kind of Privacy? Regulating Uses of Personal Data
in the Global Information Economy, 87 CAL. L. REV. 751, 763 (1999) (reviewing PAUL
M. SCHWARTZ & JOEL R. REIDENBERG, DATA PRIVACY LAW: A STUDY OF UNITED
STATES DATA PROTECTION (1996)).
42 Originally the law provided a remedy solely for physical interference with
the life and property of the individual. See MORRIS L. ERNST & ALAN U.
SCHWARTZ, PRIVACY: THE RIGHT TO BE LET ALONE 47 (1962).
43 The Supreme Court of the United States acknowledged the right of women
to have abortions based on the grounds that the federal government could not
interfere within their decisional privacy sphere. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973).
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ritorial Privacy," setting limits or boundaries on intrusion into a
specific space or area of one's property; and 5) "Information
Privacy," addressing "control of handling of personal data."44
The U.S. Constitution does not include any direct reference
to privacy within its text. However, the Bill of Rights addresses
the issue indirectly through the First Amendment rights to Free-
dom of Speech, Press and Association;45 the Third Amendment
relating to the quartering of soldiers;46 the Fourth Amendment
right to be free from unreasonable searches; 47 and the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.41 Most constitu-
tional issues related to privacy have been dealt with through the
Fourth Amendment. Notwithstanding all of this, the recogni-
tion of privacy rights within U.S. constitutional law came some-
what late, which is surprising for a nation so involved in
recognizing the protection of civil liberties. Individual privacy
rights were first recognized under the U.S. Constitution49 in jus-
tice Louis Brandeis' dissenting opinion in Olmstead v. United
States.5 ° Justice Brandeis energetically pursued the legal ground
for protection of the right to privacy against the intrusion of the
State into one's personal affairs. However, in Olmstead, the U.S.
Supreme Court upheld the ruling of the Circuit Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit, which had held that obtaining evi-
dence without physically invading constitutionally protected
areas (for instance, through wiretapping) did not violate the
Fourth Amendment and, therefore, did not constitute an illegal
44 See Domingo R. Tan, Personal Privacy in the Information Age: Comparison of In-
ternet Data Protection Regulations in the United States and the European Union, 21 Loy.
L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 661, 664 (1999).
45 See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
46 See U.S. CONST. amend. III.
47 The full text of the amendment reads as follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, pa-
pers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describ-
ing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. At the outset, the Fourth Amendment was envisaged as a
safeguard to protect private property interests against the abuse of the federal
government, a situation that was frequent during colonial times. The concept
was later extended to include privacy. See DONALD E. LIVELY, LANDMARK SUPREME
COURT CASES 127 (1999).
4s See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
49 See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, I A COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES § 395 (1968).
50 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928).
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search.51 The Court's decision created a requirement of physi-
cal invasion, adopting the so-called trespass theory of searches
and seizures of tangible property, thereby enlarging the scope of
government intrusion in the individual's private life.52
The first case where a Constitutional right of privacy was offi-
cially recognized by a majority of the U.S. Supreme Court was
Griswold v. Connecticut,5 3 where Justice Douglas, writing for the
Court, observed that "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights
have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees
that help give them life and substance .... Various guarantees
create zones of privacy. ''5 Justice Douglas' opinion acknowl-
edged the protection of privacy contained in the Bill of Rights,
inferring that protection from the applicability of the First,
Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments. The fundamen-
tal value of this case lies in the Court's recognition that several
parts of the Bill of Rights indirectly refer to and thus protect the
right of privacy. Subsequently, the U.S. Supreme Court
adopted a broader interpretation of the protection of privacy
rights in the landmark case Katz v. United States,55 stating that the
Fourth Amendment protects people rather than zones or areas
of privacy, leaving behind the trespass tangible requirement pre-
viously adopted in Olmstead.56
51 Id. at 478. The same rationale was later adopted in Goldman v. United States,
316 U.S. 129 (1942).
52 Olmstead involved the secret activities of alcohol smugglers who were inter-
cepted by the police. The ruling of the Court came when the prohibition of
alcohol was at its peak. The Court was likely influenced by the fact that the smug-
gling of alcohol became a major concern for the U.S. authorities and the media
itself. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 455.
53 See Griswold v. Connecticut., 381 U.S. 479 (1965). The case involved the
claim of a couple against a Connecticut statute prohibiting the distribution of
contraceptive information. The court ruled in favour of the couple, granting the
marital right of privacy. However, the court failed to define such a right. See PROS-
SER & KEETON ON TORTS 867 (W. Page Keeton et al eds., 5th ed. 1984).
5 4 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484. The principle of constitutionally protected areas
of privacy was adopted, inter alia, in Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961);
Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963); and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41
(1967).
55 389 U.S. 347 (1967). The Supreme Court adopted the same rationale in
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968).
56 Katz, 389 U.S. at 351, 353. The case involved the wiretapping of a telephone
conversation that an individual conducted from a public telephone booth, where
a recording device was attached. See also CHESTERJ. ANTIEAU, 1 MODERN CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAw 160 (1969).
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In the 1979 case of Smith v. Maryland 7 the Supreme Court
had to address the issue as to whether the installation, at the
request of the police, of a pen-register tape58 at a telephone
company for the purpose of listening to a phone conversation of
a presumed robber, constituted a search requiring a warrant
under the Fourth Amendment. The Court held that when the
data subject does not have a "legitimate expectation of privacy,"
the installation of a pen-register tape for the purpose of moni-
toring calls does not constitute a search. The Court established
the "legitimate expectation of privacy" test as comprising of a
two-fold requirement. First, the Court analyzed whether the in-
dividual had a legitimate expectation of privacy. If that were the
case, the Court then proceeded to examine whether society is
prepared to recognize that expectation as reasonable, and
whether the individual is entitled to be free from unreasonable
governmental intrusion.59 In a similar approach, Justice Breyer,
dissenting in Bond v. United States'0 expressed his deep concern
about the fact that the "actual expectation of privacy" is a subjec-
tive matter, but its determination must be "objectively" reasona-
ble." It is indeed interesting that the "legitimate expectation of
privacy test" established in Smith v. Maryland places an onerous
burden on the individual, who must prove not only infringe-
ment of a right, but also the reasonableness of his "legitimate
expectation." Additionally, the second component of the afore-
said test confers a significant discretionary spectrum to courts
on a case-by-case basis. Under the circumstances, it would be
legitimate to consider the level of privacy protection given to the
data subject by this precedent, particularly in view of various
lower courts' decisions in the United States.62
57 442 U.S. 735 (1979). The same reasoning was applied in Bond v. United
States, 529 U.S. 334 (2000) and California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
5 A pen-register tape was later defined as "a device which records or decodes
electronic or other impulses which identify the numbers dialled or otherwise
transmitted on the telephone line to which such device is attached." See 18
U.S.C. § 3127(3) (1994).
5" Smith, 442 U.S. at 740.
10 529 U.S. 334, 340 (2000).
61 SeeJOHN H. F. SHAIYUCK, RIGHTS OF PRIVACY 19 (1977).
2' See Smith, 442 U.S. at 735; Bond, 529 U.S. at 334; and Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 207.
Furthermore, in United States v. Smith, 978 F.2d 171 (5th Cir. 1992), involving the
interception of cordless phone conversations, the claim was denied on the basis
that the plaintiff failed to introduce evidence that his subjective expectation of
privacy was reasonable.
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Hitherto, all the cases examined herein dealt with general is-
sues of privacy protection in U.S. courts, but contained no direct
reference to the implementation of automation devices to col-
lect personal data, as this study pursues. In Whalen v. Rod3 the
Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the State of New
York could record, in a centralized computer file, the names
and addresses of all persons who have obtained, pursuant to a
doctor's prescription, certain drugs for which there is both a
lawful and unlawful market. The Court held in favor of the
State and pronounced that there was no invasion of privacy,
concluding that the State does have the right to collect such
data for public purposes. This case is compelling with respect to
issues pertaining to the use of personal data by the State or any
government agency.
64
In Iacobucci v. City of Newportb5 the Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit upheld the right of the city to request compliance
with a fingerprinting ordinance for all bar employees. Accord-
ingly, in Perkey v. Department of Motor Vehicles' the California Su-
preme Court was in favor of asserting the right of the State to
require individual citizens to provide fingerprints prior to ob-
taining a license. In Skinner v. Railway Labour Executives Associa-
tion,6" the U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged that a state
regulation compelling the collection and testing of railway em-
ployees' urine constituted a "search subject to the demands of
the Fourth Amendment." However, in applying the public-in-
terest test to the case in question, the Court considered that the
regulation sought to achieve public safety for the benefit of soci-
ety, an interest that outweighed the individual's expectation of
privacy. Then, in Vernonia School District v. Acton,6 8 the Supreme
Court held that a school district's policy authorizing the drug
testing of students participating in the district's athletics pro-
63 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
- See generally, Amy M. Jurevic, When Technology and Health Care Collide: Issues
with Electronic Medical Records and Electronic Mail, 66 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 809 (1988).
65 785 F. 2d. 1354 (6th Cir. 1986). Similar decisions were previously given in
Thom v. N.Y Stock Exch., 306 F. Supp. 1002 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), and Miller v. N.Y.
Stock Exch., 425 F. 2d. 1074 (2d. Cir. 1970).
66 721 P.2d 50 (Cal. 1986).
67 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
- 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
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grams did not violate the Fourth Amendment because the pub-
lic interest was best served thereby.69
The foregoing cases clearly support the argument that U.S.
courts, within the public sphere of the constitutional right of
privacy, show a tendency to establish the two-fold test conceived
in Smith v. Maryland, whereby the individual's expectation of pri-
vacy is balanced against the public interest of society. There-
fore, it becomes clear that when a federal agency seeks to
implement automated devices, such as biometric measurement
embedded in a smart card, for the purpose of accelerating the
passenger traffic flows, U.S. courts will rarely find a situation
where a privacy right under the protection of the Fourth
Amendment has been violated, because the public interest is be-
ing served.
B. PRIVACY ISSUES IN EUROPE
The conceptual realm of privacy rights in Europe is diametri-
cally opposed to that of the United States. Europe has placed
more emphasis on legislative edict in accordance with its long-
standing civil-law background, and followed an approach based
on predicting the probable consequences of the emergence of
particular phenomena, as has been reflected in the enactment
of omnibus regulation, rather than letting law evolve as a conse-
quence of judicial experiences.
The European approach to privacy protection is deeply
rooted in the reference made to the right of privacy in the Euro-
pean Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (the European Convention),70 Article 8 of which estab-
lishes privacy as a fundamental human right.71 Hence, Europe
tends to approach privacy as a preeminent concern of humanity
where the law should provide as much foreseeable protection as
69 For a comprehensive examination of the conflictive interest between privacy
and public safety in drug testing cases, seeJUDITH WAGNER DECEW, IN PURSUIT OF
PRIVACY 125 (1997).
70 See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms (E.T.S. No. 5), Nov. 4, 1950, art. 8, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 223, as
amended through Protocol No. 11 to the Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (E.T.S. No. 155), entered into force Nov. 1,
1998 [hereinafter Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms],
available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Convention/webConvenENG.pdf.
71 See also David Feldman, Privacy-related Rights and their Social Value, in PRIVACY
AND LOYALTY 29. (Peter Birks ed., 1997).
2002] ATTACKS ON AMERICA-PRIVACY IMPLICATIONS 99
possible.72 With the introduction of the European Convention,
numerous European countries began enacting regulation-ad-
dressing privacy.73
Later, the Council of Europe, pursuant to Resolution 73/22,
adopted the Convention for the Protection of Individuals With Regard
to Automatic Processing of Personal Data on January 28, 1981, TM
based on OECD model recommendation guidelines. 75  Al-
though the Convention included only the automated processing
of data, leaving manual processing beyond its scope, it set forth
72 The European authorities have long expressed concern about the possible
implications to individuals' privacy caused by the advancement of technology.
Hence, the Committee of Experts on Human Rights reported in 1970 that the
existing legal framework was inadequate to protect privacy rights. See LLOYD;
supra note 33, at 45.
73 The German State of Hese passed the first legislation in Europe addressing
privacy data protection in 1970. Later, Sweden passed the Svenska Datalag
(Swedish Data Act) of 1973; Germany enacted the Deutsche Bundesdaten-
schutzgsetz (Federal Data Protection Act) in 1977; France passed the Loi relative
a l'informatique, aux fichiers et aux libertes (Data Protection Act) in 1978; Aus-
tria endorsed the Datenschutzgesetz (Data Protection Act), also in 1978; finally
Great Britain established the Data Protection Act of 1984. See Viktor Mayer-
Sch6nberger, Trans-Atlantic Information Privacy Legislation and Rational Choice The-
ory, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1309, 1316 & nn.37-41 (1999); see generallyJ.A.L. STER-
LING, THE DATA PROTECTION ACT OF 1984 (2d ed. 1985); Joan Johnson-Freese,
Seven Years of Swedish Data Legislation-Analysis of Impact and Trend for the Future, in
INFORMATIQUE ET PROTECTION DE LA PERSONNALITR 69 (1981);J. VELU, LE DROIT
AU RESPECT DE LA VIE PRIVIZE 19 (1974); RAYMOND WACKS, PERSONAL INFORMATION
39 (1989); DAVID H. FLAHERTY, PROTECTING PRIVACY IN SURVEILLANCE SOCIETIES
(1989); FRANCOIS RiGAUX ET AL., LA VIE PRIVPE, UNE LIBERT, PARMI LES AUTRES?
(1992); FROM DATA PROTECTION TO KNOWLEDGE MACHINES (Peter Seipel ed.,
1990); Yves Poullet, Data Protection between Property and Liberties, in AMONGST
FRIENDS IN COMPUTERS AND LAW 161 (H.W.K. Kaspersen & Anja Oskamp eds.,
1990).
74 See Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic
Processing of Personal Data (E.T.S. No. 108), Jan. 28, 1981, reprinted in 20 INT'L
LEGAL MATERIAL 377 (1981) [hereinafter European Convention]. The EC Commis-
sion later recommended that states adopt the aforesaid Convention, understand-
ing that the establishment of a common market calls for an extensive
standardization of data processing at the European level. The rationale of the
European efforts lies in the fact that data protection is desirable because it allows
for the free movement of data and information across frontiers and prevents une-
qual conditions of competition and the subsequent distortion of the common
market. See Commission Recommendation 81/679/EEC of 29July 1981 Relating
to the Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Re-
gard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, 1981 O.J. (L 246) 31.
75 See COUNCIL OF EUROPE, EXPLANATORY REPORT ON THE CONVENTION FOR THE
PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUALS WITH REGARD TO AUTOMATIC PROCESSING OF PER-
SONAL DATA (No. 108) (1981); COUNCIL OF EUROPE, NEW TECHNOLOGIES: A CHAL-
LENGE TO PRIVACY PROTECTION? (1989). See generally PROTECTION OF PERSONAL
DATA USED FOR SOCIAL SECURITY PURPOSES (1986).
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the early goals pursued by European authorities, and identified
many of the issues that remain relevant in modern legislation.
However, the instrument's main flaw lies in the fact that it was
ratified by only a small number of countries, and hence failed to
achieve a uniform standard degree of privacy protection within
Europe.76 Therefore, the European Commission acknowledged
the necessity of taking further actions to achieve such goals by
requiring states to harmonize privacy data legislation. Thus, the
path was set for the advent of the European Privacy Data
Directive.77
On October 24, 1995, the European Parliament and the Euro-
pean Council passed Directive 95/46 (EC Directive) relating to
the protection of the processing and movement of personal
data. 78  The intention of the EC Directive's framers was to
equalize the disparity of levels of data protection within Europe,
whereby countries such as France and Germany had very com-
prehensive legislation, while others like Italy and Greece had
none. The EC Directive, which came into force in 1998, gives
substance to and amplifies those provisions contained in the Eu-
ropean Convention. The directive was enacted by the European
Commission to permit states to bring their legislation to the
same level as the minimum standards set by the EC Directive's
legal framework. 79 The aim of the EC Directive is to harmonize
the existing law of its member states."" It is the responsibility of
each member state to develop its own privacy data legislation in
accordance with the directive, which lays out the legal model to
76 See PETER P. SWIRE & ROBERT E. LITAN, NONE OF YOUR BUSINESS 24 (1998).
7 The term "data protection" has been highly criticized among scholars for
giving the connotation that information is protected rather than individuals. See
LLOYD, supra note 33, at 38.
78 Council Directive 95/46, 1995 0.J. (L 281) 31.
79 The justification of the EC Directive, found in Article 7(a), lies in the Euro-
pean Union, which aims at promoting the free movement of goods, persons, ser-
vices, and capital; therefore, the EC Directive envisions that personal data should
flow freely from one member State to another, but also acknowledges the neces-
sity of safeguarding the rights of individuals in accordance with the Convention
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 70, at art. 8. See Treaty
Establishing the European Union, Feb. 7. 1992, 0.J. (C 224/1) 448.
80 In a remarkable case concerning the legality of a national census scheduled
by the authorities, the German Constitutional court connected individuals' lib-
erty to the processing of personal data by the intended census and ruled that if
individuals do not know who is collecting the data and the purpose for such
collection, the situation will eventually create an abdication of the individuals'
rights to the processor's command, which cannot be tolerated in a democratic
society. See Simitis, supra note 18, at 447-48 (citing Volkszahlungsurteil, 65
BVerfGE 43 (1983), translated in 5 HUM Rrs. L.J. 94 (1984)).
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follow. However, one can reasonably foresee the emergence of
numerous disparities as each country enacts its own legislation,
a situation that could be aggravated when different administra-
tive agencies and courts are called on to interpret the various
provisions.
The EC Directive seeks to "protect the fundamental rights
and freedoms of natural persons, and in particular their right to
privacy with respect to the processing of personal data."81 As
clearly identified by Schwarz and Reidenberg, the EC Directive
has four main purposes: 1) to create norms for collecting and
processing personal data; 2 2) to provide an opportunity for af-
fected individuals to renew information collected about them-
selves and to review the compiler's information practices; 3) to
offer special protection for sensitive data, such as that pertain-
ing to ethnic origins, religion, or political affiliation; and 4) to
establish enforcement mechanisms and oversight systems to en-
sure that data protection principles are respected. 3
The applicability of the EC Directive extends to personal data
wholly or partially processed"4 by automatic and manual means,
as long as they form part of, or are intended to form part of, a
filing system.85 This constitutes a major difference from its
predecessor, the European Convention, which was solely in-
tended to cover the automatic processing of information, draw-
ing the line between manual and automatic processing.
Furthermore, the EC Directive presents a two-fold exclusionary
approach: 1) it is not applicable to activities that fall outside of
81 EC Directive, supra note 78, at art. 1. It is worth mentioning that the protec-
tion of privacy rights of legal persons, such as corporations, falls outside the
scope of the Directive.
82 According to the definitions contained in the Directive, the term personal
data refers to "any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural
person," clarifying that an identifiable person is someone "who can be identified,
directly or indirectly ... by reference to an identification number or to one or
more factors specific to his physical, psychological, mental, economic, cultural or
social identity." Id. at art. 2, § (a).
83 See Samuelson, supra note 41, at 763.
84 The term "processing of personal data" is referred to as "any operation or
set of operations which is performed upon personal data, whether or not by auto-
matic means, such as collection, recording, organization, storage, adaptation or
alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination
or otherwise making available, alignment or combination, blocking, erasure or
destruction." EC Directive, supra note 78, at art. 2, § (b).
85 A filing system means "any structured set of personal data which are accessi-
ble according to specific criteria, whether centralized, decentralized or dispersed
on a functional or geographical basis." Id. at art. 2, § (c).
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the scope of Community law, nor to matters concerning the
state, such as public and national security, defense, state eco-
nomic well-being, criminal investigation and breaches of ethics
in the regulated professions; and 2) it is not applicable to any
data related to purely personal or household activities.86 The
exclusion of the EC Directive's scope of issues, such as defense,
national security, and criminal investigation, removes ambiguity
for future judicial interpretations, and may clarify the applica-
tion of national privacy data protection laws in a large number
of cases. In contrast, American courts are often faced with the
necessity of formulating judicial tests in order to confront and
balance those interests.
The EC Directive undoubtedly establishes its jurisdiction by
denoting that the law of each member state shall be applicable
where either 1) the processing is carried out by a controller 7 in
the territory of the state; or 2) the controller processes data us-
ing equipment that is located in the territory of the state. In
addition, the controller has to nominate a representative for
cases where he does not operate directly in the member state's
territory, but uses equipment located in it.88 Initially, the EC
Directive's jurisdictional specifications pose significant conse-
quences for the air-transport sector, particularly considering its
potential extraterritorial applications. For example, bearing in
mind the enormous amount of personal passenger information
that carriers handle,8 9 an international airline such as Aerolinas
Argentinas might use an Amadeus Computer Reservation Sys-
tem (CRS), owned and controlled by a European carrier such as
Lufthansa. Hence, even though Aerolinas Argentinas, the con-
troller, is located outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Euro-
pean Union, the EC Directive will directly apply, because the
'6 Id. at art. 3. Some commentators have already expressed profound concern
about the fact that sometimes it can be extremely difficult to distinguish between
purely personal or household activity and the normal endeavors individuals un-
dertake through the normal course of their labor activities. The use of a laptop,
for instance, illustrates the complexity of the scenario. See SWiRE & LITAN, supra
note 76, at 70.
87 "Controller" is defined as a "natural or legal person, public authority, agency
or any other body which alone or jointly with other determines the purposes and
means of the processing of personal data." EC Directive, supra note 78, at art. 2,
§ (d). From the language of the provision, it is clear that the EC Directive is
applicable to both private organizations and government agencies that process
personal data of individuals.
88 Id. at art. 4.
89 See SwIRE & LITAN, supra note 76, at 132.
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non-European carrier is using automated equipment situated in
the territory of a member state for the purpose of processing
personal data.9 ° One can certainly foresee that the European
authorities will most likely favor the extension of such extraterri-
torial application to the non-European carrier when the latter
handles the personal data of member states' citizens. Further-
more, the EC Directive will even be applicable to cases where a
non-European airline has a frequent-flyer smart card sponsored
by a European bank. The possibilities and combinations are
endless, but the foregoing examples are common practices in
the air-transport industry.
C. THE DATA SUBJECT'S BILL OF RIGHTS
The EC Directive grants a large number of privacy rights to
the individual, and thus could be labelled as the "Data Subject's
Bill of Rights." The individual is bestowed with the right to
know both the identity of the controller and his representative,
and the purposes of processing for which the data is required.9'
In other words, when an air carrier's employee swipes a passport
through the reader device or inputs the data manually to com-
ply with API procedures, he or she must inform the data subject
of the purpose for which the data is collected, which in practice
does not usually happen. Similarly, in more complex situations,
involving, e.g., smart cards with embedded biometrics, the con-
troller must notify the data subject as to who is handling the
information and for what purposes, which could be somewhat
difficult to determine due to the large number of players in-
volved. For instance, if various players were to handle passenger
data on a "need-to-know" basis, tremendous difficulties could
arise in simply establishing who the controller is. In an earlier
article, this author observed that a state issuing machine-reada-
ble travel documents is legally obliged to inform the bearer of
the details enclosed therein.92
As in the United States, the EC Directive grants the individual
the right to access information handled by the controller. The
main difference between the two previously mentioned legal re-
gimes lies in the fact that the former only includes activities un-
90 As a matter of fact, negotiations are underway between Amadeus corporate
executives and the European authorities in order to reach an agreement viable
for both parties. See id. at 133.
91 EC Directive, supra note 78, at art. 10.
92 For details of the machine-readable passport and its development in the
ICAO, see Abeyratne, supra note 4, at 22.
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dertaken by the government and its agencies, whereas the latter
is particularly directed at private and public organizations that
happen to store, control, or process the individual's personal
data." The Data Subject Bill of Rights permits the request for
correction or erasure of any data processing that is not in accor-
dance with the provisions of the EC Directive.94 Additionally,
the data subject may object to the processing of personal infor-
mation at any time as long as he has legitimate grounds to do
soY It is important to note that the Data Subject Bill of Rights
legally empowers the individual against possible invasions, intru-
sions, or infringements of privacy rights, whereas the burden is
placed on controllers and processors of data, a situation that is
totally different than in the United States.96 Therefore, one can
easily expect that privacy claims will more likely succeed within
the legal spectrum of the EC Directive. In addition, the person
acting under the authority of the controller or the processor
must assure the confidentiality of processing, responding only to
the instructions and orders of the controller, making the latter
responsible in the event of any infringement of privacy rights.97
The foregoing has direct implications for air-transport automa-
tion since almost all of the facilitation initiatives envision the
inclusion of a large number of persons dealing with massive
amounts of personal data.
Security concerns are also addressed by requiring those in
control of databases both to provide appropriate technical and
organizational measures and to avoid information leaks. Per-
sonal data protection is particularly crucial for the air-transport
.3 EC Directive, supra note 78, at art. 12, §(a). Similarly, numerous other coun-
tries, such as Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Columbia concede the right to
access the information the government and its agencies have on the data subject
through the legal institution of the habeas data as a cause of action, which trans-
lated from Latin means bring me the data. In some countries private parties have
extended the habeas data to include the processing of personal data, although
the latter has created a constant doctrinal debate among scholars. It was first
established in the Portuguese Constitution of 1976, and then adopted by Spain in
1978, and subsequently by a large number of countries particularly in South
America. SeeJost A. MORENO RUFINELLI, NUEVAS INSTITUCIONES DE LA CONSTITU-
CION NACIONAL 145 (1996); see also CONST. ARG., art. 43 (adopted 1994); CONST.
PORT. art. 35 (adopted 1976); C.E. art. 18(4) (Spain) (adopted 1978); CONST.
COLOM. art. 25 (adopted 1991); CONST. PARA. art. 135 (adopted 1992).
94 EC Directive, supra note 78, at art. 12, §(b).
95 Id. at art. 14.
96 See M. P. Roch, Filling the Void of Data Protection in the United States: Following
the European Example, 12 COMPUTER & HIGH TECL. L.J. 71, 83 (1996).
97 EC Directive, supra note 78, at art. 16.
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sector."8 One of the most noteworthy achievements of the EC
Directive has been the establishment of Supervisory Authorities,
the bodies responsible for monitoring compliance with the Di-
rective's provisions. 9
The EC Directive specifically mandates that each member
state provide the necessary legal remedies for any breaches of
privacy rights.' 0 The data subject is entitled to receive compen-
sation from the controller in case damages are sustained. Al-
though the burden of proof is on the controller's side, he may
be exempt if he proves that he is not responsible for the dam-
age.101 This is the pro-"data subject" spirit of the EC Directive,
which not only grants fundamental rights for the protection of
privacy but also provides the mechanisms to correct any devia-
tion in the system. Perhaps this is one of the advantages of cre-
ating a specific legal framework to deal with an emerging
problem or, where every situation has been carefully studied, of
trying to envision all possible derivatives- as opposed to the
U.S. approach of letting the existing legal system respond to
each rising difficulty and develop from experience. However,
the detractors of the EC Directive would argue that its legal
framework is rather static and inflexible, handicaps that do not
allow the judiciary to adapt themselves quickly enough to
emerging technological advancements. Under the U.S. ap-
proach, judicial innovation will always precede the enactment of
legal rules, and the entrepreneurial air-transport sector will not
be in favor of adopting a stationary business attitude requiring
them to await legal regulations to solve newly arising problems.
The EC Directive asserts that member states, through the ap-
plication of their national laws, must guarantee the Directive's
full implementation and must impose sanctions in the case of
violations. '1 2 This obligation placed on member states repre-
98 Id. at art. 17.
- Id. at art. 18, § (1). For instance, the controller or his representative must
inform the Supervisory Authority before carrying out any automatic processing of
personal data. In the air transport context, this means that each incumbent in
the business must first identify who is the controller of the personal data, and
notify the supervisory authority in its respective country. The contents of the
notification should include the name and address of the controller and of his
representative, the purpose of processing, a description of the categories of the
data relating to the data subject, the recipient of the categories, and any pro-
posed transfers of data to third countries. Id. at art. 19.
100 Id. at art. 22.
1o, Id. at art. 23.
102 EC Directive, supra note 78, at art. 24.
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sents a risk for controllers, who will be forced to demand that
insurers extend insurance coverage against any possible liability
that might arise, thereby swelling premium rates and opera-
tional costs. 103
III. PRIVACY ISSUES IN CANADA
Canada, although not as prolific in its legislation as the
United States and Europe, nonetheless remains a significant
player in automation. Canada has drawn on both approaches of
the United States and Europe in the protection of privacy
rights. 0 14 The latest trends in Canadian regulation of privacy
data protection, although balancing both conflicting interests,
reflect a suis generis model.
As in the United States, the dichotomy of the two-fold ap-
proach between the public and private dimensions also appears
in the Canadian context. The Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms encompasses the public sphere of privacy data protec-
tion, addressing the relationship between individuals and the
government.Ill5 Canadian courts have determined that two par-
ticular sections of this Act indirectly address privacy issues. Sec-
tion 7 provides that "everyone has the right to life, liberty and
security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof
except in accordance with the principles of fundamental jus-
tice, ' 1°6 and Section 8 is the equivalent of the Fourth Amend-
ment to the U.S. Constitution, protecting individuals against
unreasonable search and seizure. 107
In the 1984 case Hunter v. Southam Inc.,'018 involving the unrea-
sonable search and seizure provision of Section 8 of the Cana-
dian Charter, the Supreme Court of Canada acknowledged the
existence of the right of privacy as the right to be let alone. The
Court found that the right of privacy "is the right to be secure
against encroachment upon the citizens' reasonable expectation
103 See HANDBOOK ON COST EFFECTIVE COMPLIANCE WITH DIRECTIVE 95/46/EC
78, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/dataprot/stud-
ies/handbook.pdf.
104 See generally DAVID H. FLAHERTY, PROTECTING PRIVACY IN TwO-WAY ELEC-
TRONIC SERVICE 11 (1985).
105 CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982), part I (Charter of Rights and Free-
doms), ch. 11, § 7.
106 Id.
107 Id. § 8.
108 [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145.
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of privacy in a free and democratic society."' ' In its decision,
the Court favored a case-by-case analysis to determine whether
the law gives a remedy for the invasion of privacy." t The Court
interpreted privacy similarly to the United States, examining the
individual's "reasonable expectation of privacy." Therefore, one
can reasonably say that when a case involves privacy infringe-
ment by federal government agencies as a result of implement-
ing automation endeavours in air transport, Canadian courts,
like their U.S. counterparts, may tend to apply the reasonable
expectation of privacy test. In addition, Canada has enacted the
Privacy Data Act," ' governing the collection, use and disclosure
of personal information and regulating the conduct of federal
agencies with respect to the processing of such data, and the
Access to Information Act,' 2 granting individuals access thereto.
Numerous Canadian provinces have also adopted privacy legisla-
tion.' 13 Both the federal government and the provinces can ex-
ercise jurisdiction on privacy matters. The most significant fact,
particularly at the provincial level, stems from the fact that Ca-
nada has extended the jurisdiction of the Privacy Commission to
include not only the provisions dictated by the Privacy Act, but
also to those of the Freedom of Information Act. ' 4 This watchdog
institution plays a significant role in the protection, investiga-
tion, enforcement, and mediation of privacy rights in Canada at
the provincial and federal level.
A. THE EMERGENCE OF A Sui GENERIS MODEL
Canadians have hitherto not had a single comprehensive leg-
islation with respect to the private sphere of privacy data protec-
tion, but, rather, sectoral regulation attempting to address
109 Id. at 159 (quoting Southam, Inc. v. Dir. of Investigation & Research,
[1983] 24 Alta. L.R.2d 307).
110 Similar decisions in Canadian courts were reached in Scanne v. Orr, [1981]
34 O.R.2d 317 (Co. Ct.) and Lipiec v. Borsa [1996], 31 C.C.L.T. (2d) 294 (Ont.
Gen. Div.). The right of privacy has been protected in Canada and the Common-
wealth countries under a myriad of different legal theories, inter alia, contract,
trespass, nuisance, and defamation. See Green v. Minnes, [1891] 22 O.R. 177
(C.A.); Motherwell v. Motherwell, [1976] 73 D.L.R. (3d) 62 (Alta. C.A.); Robbins
v. C.B.C., [1957] 12 D.L.R.2d 35.
111 Privacy Act, R.S.C., ch. P-21 (1985).
112 Freedom of Information Act, R.S.C., ch. A-i (1985).
11 See Privacy Act, R.S.B.C., ch. 373 (1996) (B.C., Can.); Privacy Act, R.S.M.,
ch. P125 (1987) (Man., Can.); Privacy Act, Nfld. R.S., ch. P-22 (1990) (Nfld.,
Can.); Privacy Act, S.S., ch. P-24 (1978) (Sask., Can.).
114 See David H. Flaherty, Some Reflections on Privacy and Technology, 26 MAN. L.J.
219, 222 (1999).
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specific privacy issues related to certain industries. "' Had the
privacy issue not been contemplated by one of the sectoral legis-
lations enacted, the matter would have been resolved by the tort
of privacy in the common law provinces, and by statute in the
civil law Quebec." 6 The tort of privacy invasion has faced the
same difficulties and shortcomings as the one contained in the
United States system. Quebec, following the European exam-
ple, has adopted the Act Respecting the Protection of Personal Infor-
mation in the Private Sector,117 which extended the application of
privacy data protection to the processing performed by govern-
ment agencies, as well as private parties, constituting an innova-
tion in North America.'18 This act regulates the collection, use,
and disclosure of personal information held by the private en-
trepreneurial sector operating in Quebec, and grants the indi-
vidual the right of access to such information. Moreover,
Quebec's Civil Code grants the protection and respect of privacy
rights.1 9 Thus, the legal framework established in Quebec
would seem to be the only one that is in accord with the strin-
gent requirements contained in the EC Directive. Some com-
mentators have suggested that the level of privacy protection in
Canada offered at the provincial level considerably exceeds that
of the federal government with respect to the private sector. 120
115 See e.g. Telecommunications Act, R.S.C., ch. T-3.4, §§ 39,41 (1993) (Can.);
Bank Act, R.S.C., ch. B-101, §§ 242, 244, 259 (1991) (Can.); Insurance Compa-
nies Act, R.S.C., ch. 1-11.8, §§ 489, 607 (1991) (Can.); Trust and Loan Companies
Act, R.S.C., ch. T-19.8, §444 (1991); Canada Pension Plan Act, R.S.C., ch. C-8,
§ 104 (1985).
116 For a comprehensive study on Canadian common law torts, see John D. R.
Craig, Invasion of Privacy and Charter Values: The Common-Law Tort Awakens, 42 Mc-
GILL L.J. 355 (1997). For Quebec civil law privacy data protection, see KAPIM
BENYEKHLEF, LA PROTECTION DE LA VIE PRIVtE DANS LES tCHANGES INTERNATIONAUX
D'INFORMATIONS 92 (1992); Paul-Andre Comeau & Andre Ouimet, Freedom of In-
formation and Privacy: Quebec's Innovative Role in North America, 80 IowA L. REV. 651
(1995); H. Patrick Glenn, The Right to Privacy in Quebec Law, in ASPECTS OF PRIVACY
LAw 41 (Dale Gibson ed., 1980); Rend Laperrikre, The 'Quebec Model' of Data Protec-
tion: A Compromise between Laissez-faire and Public Control in a Technological Era, in
VISIONS OF PRIVACY: POLICY CHOICES FOR THE DIGITAL AGE 182 (ColinJ. Bennett &
Rebecca Grant eds., 1997).
117 S.Q., ch. 17 (1993).
118 See Comeau & Ouimet, supra note 116, at 651.
11 See C.C.Q., arts. 35-41 (1993) (Can.).
120 See COLINJ. BENNETT, IMPLEMENTING PRIVACY CODES OF PRACTICE 8 (1995).
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B. THE PERSONAL INFORMATION PROTECTION AND ELECTRONIC
DOCUMENTS ACT
In order to balance the disproportion created by the Act Re-
specting the Protection of Personal Information in the Private Sector en-
acted in Quebec with respect to the other provinces, and the
fragmented federal regulation (or the lack thereof), Canada has
enacted federal legislation. After a long process of negotiations,
an agreement was reached in the Personal Information Protection
and Electronic Documents Act, 12' which was passed on April 13,
2000. The Act came into force progressively on January 1, 2001,
and comprises two main parts: 1) the protection of personal in-
formation, and 2) the regulation of electronic documents as an
alternative to the use of paper to record information or transac-
tions.' 22 The Act seeks to establish rules governing "the collec-
tion, use, and disclosure of personal information" in a manner
that balances the right of privacy of all individuals with "the
need of organizations to collect, use, or disclose personal infor-
mation for purposes that a reasonable person would consider
appropriate in the circumstances."' 23 The foregoing represents
a credible attempt to consider not only the interests of the indi-
vidual in protecting his privacy rights, but also a remarkable ef-
fort not to place an enormous burden on the private
entrepreneurial sector. It represents an approach that favors
the adoption of privacy data protection legislation without hin-
dering the normal course of private business. The Act was
passed only after consideration of market implications on the
private sector. It is the result of a consensus reached among the
many players involved. The Act was based on the Canadian
Standards Association's Model Code for the Protection of Personal In-
formation.1'24 The latter has been included in the Act as "Sched-
121 S.C., 5 (2000).
122 Id. §§ 3, 32.
123 Id. § 3; see also Backgrounder: Privacy Provisions Highlights, available at http://
e-com.ic.gc.ca/english/fastfacts/43d8.html (last visited July 28, 2000). Personal
information is defined in the act as information about an identifiable individual,
but does not include the name, title or business address or telephone number of
an employee of an organization. Personal Information Protection and Electronic
Documents Act, S.C. ch. 5, at § 2(1). However, the act does not apply to personal
information used, collected, or disclosed by an individual for a personal purpose,
or by an organization forjournalistic, artistic, literary, or any activity outside of its
commercial purpose. Id. § 4.
124 The Canadian Standards Association has established ten principles for a
Model Code for the Protection of Personal Data, including: 1) Accountability Prin-
ciple, making the organization responsible for personal information under its
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ule 1", aiming at providing the private entrepreneur with
guidelines, principles, and suggestions for the development of
adequate mechanisms in order to properly safeguard individu-
als' personal information. 125 Herein lies one of the main differ-
ences between the Canadian law and the EC Directive: the EC
Directive was enacted more out of favoritism for the individual's
right of privacy, conceived as a fundamental human right,
rather than as a balance between competing interests between
individuals and private entrepreneurs, as in the Canadian
context.
The Canadian act was designed to be implemented in three
different phases: 1) for organizations in the federally regulated
private sector, such as airlines, telecommunications, banking,
broadcasting, and interprovincial transportation, beginning Jan-
uary 1, 2001, 2) for health information, beginning January 1,
2002, and 3) for full application, including commercial use of
personal information, whether or not regulated by federal law,
on January, 1 2004.126 The rationale behind this progressive im-
plementation of the Act lies in the fact that certain industry sec-
tors might require more time to adapt to the new privacy data
requirements. Needless to say, the Act's first phase of imple-
control; 2) Identifying Purposes Principle, whereby the intention behind the collec-
tion of such data must be identified to the data subject at or before the informa-
tion is collected; 3) Consent Principle, making consent and knowledge necessary
for the collection, use or disclosure of personal information; 4) Limiting Use, Dis-
closure, and Retention Principle, whereby personal information shall only be used
for its intended purpose, disclosed with the individual's consent, and retained
only for the necessary time to comply with its objective, unless otherwise required
by the laws; 5) Limiting Use, Disclosure, and Retention Principle, whereby personal
information shall only be used for its intended purpose, disclosed with the indi-
vidual's consent, and retained only for the period of time necessary to comply
with its objective, unless otherwise required by law; 6) Accuracy Principle, meaning
that personal information must be precise, complete and up-to-date; 7) Security
Principle, whereby personal information shall be protected from unwanted intru-
sion; 8) Openness Principle, whereby the organization makes available to the indi-
vidual, information about its policies and practices with respect to the handling
of personal information; 9) Individual Access Principle, whereby an individual is
granted access to the organization's record of his personal information upon re-
quest; and 10) Challenge and Compliance Principle, whereby an individual is capable
of challenging the agency's compliance with the aforesaid principles to a specific
institution. Id. at schedule 1. See also Canadian Standards Ass'n, Model Code for the
Protection of Personal Information, available at http://www.csa-international.org/en-
glish/product services/ps-privacy.html (last visited July 30, 2000).
125 Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, at sch. 1.
126 Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Personal Information Protection and
Electronic Documents Act-Implementation Schedule, at http://www.privcom.
gc.ca/legislation/indexe.asp (last visited July 29, 2000).
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mentation will already affect air carriers' common practices and
operations, which could have significant consequences on im-
plementing automation initiatives in air transport. One can eas-
ily envision that the air-transport players might have to redesign
numerous practices and procedures in order to comply with the
Act's requirements.
C. THE "REASONABLE COLLECTION, USAGE AND
DISCLOSURE" PRINCIPLE
The Act denotes that an organization may collect, use, or dis-
close personal information solely for "purposes that a reasona-
ble person would consider are appropriate in the
circumstances," 127 incorporating the longstanding common-law
rule of reasonableness. It will depend on the Privacy Commis-
sioner and the courts to interpret the legal parameters of rea-
sonable purposes in appropriate circumstances. The language
of the Act suggests a slightly different connotation than the one
contained in the EC Directive, which makes reference to the col-
lection of data for "specified, explicit and legitimate pur-
poses."1 28 The latter has a smaller discretionary spectrum,
whereas the former enlarges the Act's interpretive power.
1. The "Consent and Knowledge" Principle
The Act follows the European principle of data protection,
namely that the information cannot be collected or used with-
out the consent of the data subject; however, the Canadian legis-
lation extends the latter to include the individual's consent and
knowledge thereto. 29 The purpose of this extension is to en-
sure that private organizations make all necessary efforts to rea-
sonably let the data subject know and understand how the
information will be handled. This means that organizations
wishing to implement automation initiatives must clearly obtain
the consent of the data subject and at the same time inform him
of the intention of the processing and usage thereof. Neverthe-
less, the Act provides exceptions where data can be processed
without the data subject's consent; for example, where the col-
lection is clearly in the interests of the individual, where the in-
127 Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, S.C. ch. 5,
§ 5(3).
128 Compare id. § 5(3) with EC Directive, supra note 78, at art. 6(b).
129 See Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, S.C.
ch. 5, sch. 1, § 4.3.2.
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formation is already publicly available, or where the
organization has reasonable grounds to believe that the individ-
ual might be contravening Canadian laws.1 0
Canadian legislation provides that organizations cannot use
an individual's personal information without the knowledge or
consent of the data subject, unless otherwise required by law.1 3 '
The data subject can request, in writing, individual access to the
information,1 32 and the organization must respond within thirty
days of receiving this request. 133 However, organizations can ex-
tend the period for another thirty days, where the request "un-
reasonably interferes with the activities of the organization," or
where more time is required to convert the data subject's infor-
mation into an alternative format." 4 The Act also provides rem-
edies where an individual's right of privacy is violated, in which
case the data subject may file a written complaint with the Pri-
vacy Commissioner,'35 and, once a report has been issued on the
matter, may apply to the courts for a hearing.'3 6 One can easily
expect that the preceding requirements will somewhat change
the industry players' procedures and practices.
2. Transborder Data Flows
On its face, the Act does not present any significant legal bar-
rier to the transborder flow of personal data, although it man-
dates that where personal information is transferred for
processing to a third party, organizations must enter into a con-
tractual relationship with such party to ensure a sufficient level
of privacy protection.1 3 7 This presents a more flexible require-
ment than the adequacy principle envisioned within the Euro-
pean legal framework, which establishes that personal
130 Id. § 7(1).131 Id. § 7(2).
1"2 Id. § 8(1); see a1so id. at sch. 1, § 4.9.
133 Id. § 8(3).
134 Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, S.C. ch. 5,
§ 8(4).
135 Id. § 11. The Commissioner may even conduct audits of the practices of
certain organizations where he has reasonable grounds to believe that such enter-
prise may be contravening the provisions of the act. Id. at § 18(1). Similarly, the
act contains a whistle blowing provision, whereby any person who has reasonable
grounds to believe that a person or an organization has infringed the act may
notify the Commissioner. Id. § 27.
136 Id. § 14. The court could order the organization to correct its practices and
procedures, or even award damages to the plaintiff. Id. § 16.
1-7 Id. sch. 1, § 4.1.3.
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information can only be transferred to third countries that offer
the same standard or level of privacy protection. Although ex-
ceptions are provided, this represents the general rule, while the
Canadian Act provides an alternative mechanism, such as the
adoption of contractual provisions by the parties, instead of di-
rectly restricting the flow of personal data as done by the EC
Directive.
The spirit of the Act calls for the avoidance of possible legal
hurdles facing the entrepreneurial sector, providing for the
long-awaited combination of legal regulation and business self-
participation. The private sector's initiatives, which are carefully
observed by government authorities from an "arm's-length" dis-
tance, become of paramount importance in the proper develop-
ment of the system. One can certainly envision a large number
of contractual provisions governing the relationships of diverse
players when implementing automation initiatives in air trans-
port. For example, Air Canada may be particularly keen on
drafting thorough contractual provisions to govern its contrac-
tual relationships with those enterprises that handle the per-
sonal information of its passengers' frequent flyer smart cards,
as in the case of banking institutions. Another relevant provi-
sion of the Act refers to the safeguards necessary to guarantee
the security of personal information. It establishes that organi-
zations should include: 1) physical measures, such as restricting
access to the organization's offices; 2) organizational measures
restricting access to sensitive information according to the
"need to know" principle; and 3) technological measures favor-
ing the use of passwords and encryption. 8 These principles
certainly apply to all the automation endeavors envisioned in
this article, and could represent a valuable tool to avoid any in-
formation leaks in the system. As previously explained, such
leaks could have awful consequences for individuals' right of pri-
vacy, especially when one considers the large amounts of data
involved.
Although by no means a comprehensive legal remedy for
problems posed by the privacy issues inherent in data storage
and the exchange of information, the Canadian Act represents a
novel approach to the issue of privacy data protection, primarily
because it was created through a consensus of regulators, indus-
try players and privacy organization groups. Privacy data protec-
tion in Canada is certainly consistent with the stringent
138 Id. at sch. 1, § 4.7.3.
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standards established by European legislation, particularly with
the recent enactment of the Personal Information Protection and
Electronic Documents Act in accordance with the EC Directive's
strict requirements. Consequently, issues of transborder data
flows are most likely not to occur between the two parties. How-
ever, the Act strongly encourages the adoption of alternative
mechanisms by means of contractual provisions, as well as the
implementation of the long-awaited Model Code on Data
Protection.
IV. CONCLUSION
Individuals have a legal right to know what goes into a data
bank with regard to their own details. Accordingly, states that
store such information are legally obligated to inform individu-
als of the nature of the details that might be included in public
documents, such as their passports. Likewise, states should
make arrangements to inform individuals of the information
stored in governmental computers relating to them. Any indeci-
pherable data should be clearly explained to the individual so
that he can: 1) determine whether such data should be dis-
closed to the public; 2) determine the accuracy of the details
entered into the computer; 3) be informed of the specific use of
his personal data that is stored in the computer; 4) be informed
of the type of persons who would have access to the personal
data that is stored; and 5) evaluate the amount of personal infor-
mation about him that is actually stored.
Since the data contained in such documents, such as pass-
ports and visas, are machine readable and would be subject to
transborder storage, there is a compelling need to consider the
introduction of uniform privacy laws so that the interests of the
data subject and the data seeker are protected. Although com-
plete uniformity in privacy legislation may be a difficult objec-
tive to attain, " it will be well worth the while of the
international community to at least formulate international
standards and recommend practices, along the lines of the vari-
ous ICAO Annexes, to serve as guidelines for state conduct. Af-
ter all, as Collin Mellors pointed out: "Under international
agreements . . . privacy is now well established as a universal,
natural, moral and human right." Article 12 of the Universal
1-'9 See Gordon C. Everest, Nonuniform Privacy Laws: Implications and Attempts at
Uniformity, in COMPUTERS AND PRIVACY IN THE NEXT DECADE 146 (Lance J. Hoff-
man ed., 1980).
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Declaration of Human Rights, Article 17 of the United Nations
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and Article 8 of the Euro-
pean Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fun-
damental Freedoms all specify this basic right to privacy. Man
everywhere has occasion to seek temporary "seclusion or with-
drawal from society" and such arrangements cannot define the
precise area of the right to privacy.14 ° Such a definition is
needed to reconcile the interests of ensuring respect for individ-
uals' information and privacy on the one hand and the encour-
agement of free and open dissemination of transborder data
flows on the other.
As for the use of biometric information such as hand geome-
try and eye scanning, such purely biological information should
be used only for identification purposes with explicit assurances
by the authorities that the information will not be used for any
other purpose. Before a process for the collection of such infor-
mation is formally put into practice, legal issues of ownership
and patent should be carefully thought out, and given the ut-
most consideration.
140 Collin Mellors, Governments and the Individual-Their Secrecy and His Privacy,
in PRIVACY 94 (John B.Young ed., 1978).
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